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Discussant's Response to 
Some Thoughts on Materiality 
Joseph J. Schultz, Jr. 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
In addition to it being a real pleasure to be here at Kansas and to have the 
opportunity to exchange ideas with you, I am particularly honored to have the 
distinction of discussing the paper by Ken Stringer. I know of no other 
individual who is more responsible for moving the technical aspect of audit 
practice along more than Ken. I suspect that Ken would be the first to admit 
that progress is not always achieved without a few detours along the way. I 
think we would all acknowledge that without taking a few side trips down these 
unchartered roads, life would become static and dull. My remarks today center 
on the proposition that once again Ken is moving us in the right direction, but 
not necessarily along the four-lane. My remarks today will be divided into 
issues related to the paper and ideas on materiality generally. 
The Paper 
The concept of materiality is a threshold concept that relates to the users of 
information who make a myriad of decisions. In our society, a major group of 
these decisions are made by investors who buy, sell or hold securities based on 
this information. We, as accountants and auditors, are interested particularly in 
the role that financial statements play in that set of information. Society gives 
us general direction in carrying out our role as auditors. An indication of some 
of this direction is evidenced in the following excerpts. 
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the 
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information 
required to those matters about which an average prudent investor ought 
reasonably to be informed. Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02. (Emphasis 
added.) 
. . . A fact which if it has been correctly stated or disclosed would have 
deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing 
the securities in question. Escott, et al. v. BarChris Construction 
Corporation. 283 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y.) 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.) 
The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man would 
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction in question . . . (and the above test would encompass any 
fact) which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the 
value of the corporation's stock or securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co. 401 F2d 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.) 
There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
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significantly altered the "Total mix" of information made available. 
TSC Industries, Inc., et al. v. Northway, Inc. 426 US 438 (1976). 
(Emphasis added.) 
These guidelines provide us with some direction that is unambiguous. 
• Materiality is user oriented. 
• Materiality is part of a total mix of information. 
• The item subject to a materiality decision must have a substantial 
likelihood of significantly altering the total mix of information. 
The excerpts, however helpful in their direction, fail to clarify a number of 
issues. For example: 
• Should the auditor look solely to the investment community in judging 
materiality? 
• How can the auditor identify the users' mix of information? 
• Furthermore, how can the auditor assess the current state of the 
users in order to know what change would represent a substantial 
likelihood of significantly altering the user's mix? 
• Should attention focus on the market value of the security or on the 
reasonably prudent investor? 
This last point is subtle. Beaver (1968, pp. 69-70) differentiates between 
two types of market reaction to information—individual reaction within the 
market place (volume change) and aggregate market reaction (price change). 
Notice that only the guidance from the Texas Gulf Sulphur case directly 
mentions the market price and it is mentioned in conjunction with the individual 
orientation. Yet, the other three—including the most recent—still cling to the 
individual orientation. While this differentiation may not be terribly important in 
determining damages from an investors' standpoint, as such damage is based 
on changes in market price, it presents a problem for the auditor in assessing 
other users' needs and for basing his or her materiality judgments on any 
individual's judgments—even a reasonably prudent investor's. 
The Market Data Approach 
By adopting a market data based approach, Ken chooses to address the 
investment community, to consider the total mix of information that affects the 
prices, and to measure the sensitivity of the price to movements in several 
accounting variables (particularly net income). Finally, Ken elects to ignore the 
individual and focus instead on the market value of the security. Ken's paper 
represents a serious attempt to deal effectively with each of these major 
issues. In that regard, it is exemplary. However, as Dyckman, Downes, and 
Magee (1975) point out, this market based approach is not without peril. 
Indeed, as all researchers who have filtered through study after study know, 
there is no one project that is significantly likely to provide the answer to 
serious problems. Ken's paper and materiality fall into this category. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with Ken's approach is that the time 
series of earnings levels and security price levels are probably nonstationary. 
Because they are not stationary their relationship, as expressed by a 
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correlation coefficient, is likely to be overstated. The accompanying figure may 
help us gain some insight into this problem. Chart A in Ken's paper gives us a 
picture of two variables which are highly dependent. Indeed, Ken reports a 
correlation of 0.95. However, one may justifiably raise several questions. Is 
there some underlying variable creating a trend in each of these variables? 
Also, is there some trend that each of these variables follows as a result of this 
other variable? Francis (1976, p. 587) cites a study that indicates that New 
York Stock Exchange stock prices rose about 6.8 percent per year from 1926 
through 1965. It is likely that EPS also rose during this period. Indeed, it is 
likely that both have continued to rise generally until I invested about a year 
ago. 
Let us examine Figure 1, which represents the data from Table 1 
rearranged against time. The X's on the diagram represent EPS. The 0's 
represent price. I believe the impact of time is evident and generally consistent 
with an increasing trend for both of these variables. 
How then can we get away from this problem? One way may be to fit 
various models to the data as they stand, which could compensate for the drift. 
Another way is to use a first difference model. That is, contrast the changes in 
EPS with the comparable changes in price. Figure 2 represents these first 
differences plotted against one another. The correlation coefficient of this 
series is .60. Notice that the amount of "explained" association has fallen from 
about 90% using Ken's approach to about 36% using a statistically more 
correct approach. This rearrangement points out a major problem with looking 
at the raw data—namely that the strength of the relationships is overstated and 
the significant number of relationships is overstated. Neter and Wasserman 
(1974, pp. 352 ff.) point out other problems. Francis (1976, pp. 587-588) points 
out that even the distribution of first differences is unstable. Since this 
evidence regarding the first difference is not as compelling, one might try to 
construct a measure based on first differences. One potential model may take 
the following form. 
Price t + 3 + Dividends - Price t - 9 = a + b EPS - E P S 
year ended year ended 
month t month t -12 
This model would help the nonstationary problem, recognize the prepon­
derance of findings regarding the time patterns of earnings, and assist with the 
problem of getting the amount of return matched to the period affected by the 
earnings' release time. One may also wish to try to use quarterly data (Foster, 
1978, pp. 106 ff.). However, I feel that both these approaches are rather 
crude, and it seems to me that a model based on returns is a better approach. 
Francis (1976, pp. 588 ff.) indicates that such an approach may be better—at 
least given the statistical properties of security prices over time. Furthermore, 
using return data as the dependent variable would more closely relate to 
existing investment theory and practice models as I understand them. 
The cross sectional analyses in the paper are subject to some rigorous 
statistical assumptions. With this in mind, I shall not discuss them, but merely 
refer interested parties to work by Johnston (1972). 
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Figure 1 
Price and EPS Plotted Against Time 
Data from Stringer's Table 1 
Price EPS 
1960 1965 
Year 
1970 
x = EPS 
o = Price 
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Figure 2 
Price versus ΔEPS Data 
from Stringer's Table 1 
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ΔPrice 
Some Specific Observations 
The key point that should come out of my remarks is that Ken's work 
attempted to establish a paradigm that did describe behavior of prices as 
related to accounting data while considering many of the relevant issues. Since 
some of the problems that I have cited came into the literature after Ken's 
work, it should not bear adversely on his study. Rather, it should advance the 
challenge to those among us who are equipped to. perform such research. I 
should also add that Dopuch and Watts (1972, p. 184) have proposed using 
time-series methodology to assist the auditor in making materiality decisions. 
Kaplan (1978) has cited some problems with these approaches, but Foster 
(1978b, pp. 47-48) has observed that they may not be insurmountable. The 
Dopuch-Watts' proposal would acknowledge a significant change in net income 
brought on by an item subject to a materiality decision as one criterion. I think 
we must remember that any of these models are merely surrogates for true 
materiality. 
If we pursue a market-based approach, we should bear in mind several 
problems. First, it is unlikely to yield a model that is sufficiently sensitive to 
potential changes in accounting numbers that will help us much. This may be 
judged by some to imply the immateriality of such potential changes. Secondly, 
while it could be arguably better than the individual approach in assessing the 
impact of potential changes in an accounting number in a mix of information, it is 
not without problems in that such a model must be forward looking and 
necessarily depend on estimates. Thirdly, while it may better approach the 
social welfare paradigm than the individual approach, it does not, per se, 
constitute an appropriate measure for such paradigm (cf. Gonedes and Dopuch, 
1974). Finally, it is not readily apparent that the courts would accept this 
approach even though one might conjecture that it would be acceptable based 
on some interpretations of market-based theory and the prudent man rule 
applicable to decisions of pension fund trustees under ERISA (Pozen, 1977). 
Foster (1980) points out some other issues that should be considered before 
attacking the topic using this approach. 
The User Approach 
Let me change orientation now and discuss the individual user approach to 
determination of materiality levels. Ken's paper implied that some materiality 
guidelines should be proposed for the "usual'' situation. I am not sure that I 
understand this term. It seems to me that financial statements are likely to be 
used for a given company at a given point in time primarily for either equity 
investment decisions or credit decisions. There is implied support in this use 
specificity in professional standards. SAS No. 39 "Audit Sampling" (1981) 
indicates that the auditor should consider the effect of any potential misstate­
ment on the expected use of such financial statements in determining ultimate 
risk. If the auditor knows a client well, then it should be possible to assess the 
intended principal use of the statements in most cases. Where there appears to 
be an "ordinary" situation, the auditor should be able to adequately assess the 
materiality bounds pretty well. I base this conclusion on the proposition that 
very, very few audits result in any serious allegations of misstatement. Thus, 
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the cost of the variability in materiality levels on the audit may be measured on 
a societal basis primarily by a misallocation of resources. In an "ordinary" 
case, this misallocation may take the form of an interest rate that differs from 
optimal or a security price that differs from optimal. Both of these differentials 
are probably minor. For, when trying to measure this misallocation, notice that 
financial statement numbers are only part of a complex set of other information 
on which interested parties base their decisions. Other components might 
include product development prospects, market share, quality of management, 
etc. Note also that these decisions are primarily based on future states of these 
variables and therefore are likely to contain a considerable degree of variation 
and subjectivity. Therefore, I see no immediate cost justification for imple­
menting an unduly rigid materiality rule for "ordinary" audits. 
What is an "ordinary" audit? I am not sure that I know, but I can offer a 
few under-developed guidelines. An ordinary audit involves an auditee who is 
not in financial distress, who is not an apparent merger target, who is not intent 
on spinning off subsidiaries, who is not registering securities, who is not 
blessed with management of doubtful integrity and who is not encumbered with 
a lousy internal accounting control system. These characteristics are meant to 
represent potential criteria that would have to be combined in some unknown 
manner to identify "extraordinary" audits. I feel sure that members of the 
AICPA Task Force on Materiality and Audit Risk as well as Albrecht, Romney, 
and others (cf. Albrecht, et al., 1982) could suggest other danger signals. The 
key point I want to make is to have these types of clients bear the cost of more 
stringent materiality bounds and more auditor time. 
In such situations the prudent audit firm may wish to alter the nature of the 
audit procedures, involve more senior audit personnel, and push the timing of 
such procedures back as far as practicable. Thus, the extent of testing, which 
would be the primary variable affected by a quantitative guideline, would be 
only one dimension triggered by auditees in this unusual category. A broader 
view of materiality in conjunction with audit risk should increase the real audit 
quality associated with these financial statements. The risk would lie primarily 
with the accounting firm to do the job. Failures on its part could be expected to 
lead to market pressures that would diminish the reputation of the firm—even 
to the point of ruin. 
Since the profession will also be damaged to an extent with any audit 
failure, it should provide guidance on characteristics that denote an extraordi­
nary audit. For example, it could propose the assistance of one or more outside 
specialists in such audits. This action would raise the auditor's loss function if 
he ignored such guidance and the financial statements subsequently proved to 
be materially in error. On the other hand, the auditor who followed such 
guidance should have gone a long way toward establishing a good faith defense 
in the event that the statements were determined to be materially in error. At 
the present time, the auditor alone assesses the users' decision models, their 
current portfolio state, their attitudes toward risk, and so on. For a single 
unknown user in society, accurate assessment is impossible. Thus, the auditor 
could call in an expert financial analyst for the client's industry or an expert 
lending analyst familiar with the client's industry or some combination of one or 
more of each of these. The auditor could have him, her, or them assess the 
159 
critical assertions in the financial statements. I personally believe that some 
type of multiple attribute utility function could then be developed to assist the 
auditor in determining which numbers or disclosures in the statements were in 
the critical, threshold range. This in turn would allow the auditor to address 
those areas with the appropriate intensity to meet his or her own utility 
function. 
An alternative approach would be to set some percentage of some earnings 
figure for an overall materiality bound. My understanding of firm valuation 
research (e.g., Miller and Modigliani, 1961) and other research findings (cf. 
Foster, 1978) including those from behavioral decision theory research (cf. 
Libby, 1981) leads me to believe that this referent is the most reasonable 
single candidate. Furthermore, it could satisfy the need that any specific 
guidance in any Statement on Auditing Standards at the current time must be 
relatively straight-forward and simplistic. Therefore, I believe this one would 
be as good or better than any other based on current knowledge. 
More Finite Guidance? 
If, however, more finite guidance is deemed necessary and appropriate, I 
feel the materiality bound should be set at one percent of net income. Such a 
bound would undoubtedly create an increased demand for auditors and tend to 
place upward pressure on my salary level. Of course, I am not serious about 
such a stringent bound. Rather, I wish to make the point that as auditors we 
should not let our strong desire for a quality product from a profession that is 
dear to many of us assembled here, lead us to standards that are apparently too 
costly for any reasonable benefit to our society. This proposition holds even if 
we perceive that that same society has unleashed some competitive forces 
upon us recently that, in my opinion, tend to reduce audit quality. One minor 
encouraging sign in this matter currently lies in my desk drawer in my desk 
back in Urbana. That is, someone has done a paper that strongly suggests that 
the perceived prestige and quality of members of the traditional Big Eight are 
positively related to the perceived cost of their services. If this perception 
carries over to actions (including increased quality of audit with increased cost) 
then audit clients with "better" audit firms may benefit by lower costs of 
borrowing, because the subjects of this study were the chief financial officers at 
the nation's 25 largest banks. 
I have not discussed any specific research projects, but I feel we could do 
research at the individual level to help with generating an appropriate 
methodology for eliciting the outside specialists' multiple attribute utility 
function or contribute some studies that could assist the task force in 
determining if setting a selected percent of income for planning materiality 
would increase the consensus of judgments among auditors. 
Before I end, I thank Ken for writing a paper that made me think about this 
important issue. I also thank Howard and Don for asking me to be a discussant 
which undoubtedly piqued my own utility function. Finally, I hope my ideas 
further the progress on the issue of materiality judgments in auditing. 
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